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Abstract
We develop an equilibrium model of the market for entrepreneurial finance where all
agents are endowed with some wealth and a project whose quality is their private
information. All agents are capital constrained and need to choose whether to invest as
entrepreneurs or financiers, or not to invest. We compare this economy to one where
finance comes from the outside. Removing outside investors tends to improve efficiency
by raising the cost of capital and creating advantageous selection where the agents with
productive projects become entrepreneurs and those with unproductive ones become their
financiers. If funding is easier to come by, entrepreneurship becomes attractive also for
unproductive agents. Financial liberalization may therefore have harmful efficiency effects
due to adverse selection. In our model insufficient wealth generally holds back business
creation, but the markets for entrepreneurial finance can nonetheless exhibit too much
activity.
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1I. INTRODUCTION
A key choice a would-be entrepreneur encounters is how to use her personal wealth.
Should she really become an entrepreneur, invest her wealth in the potential project of
her own and raise the rest from outside? Or is it more profitable to invest the assets in
the financial market to finance the projects of others? Or is it better yet to put aside
the investment opportunities all together and just to consume the assets? These
considerations are inherent in any financial market from microfinance of developing
countries with sparse investment and savings choices to the sophisticated markets of
rich countries where access to interest-bearing savings account and mutual funds is
widely available and where successful entrepreneurs become private equity investors
and vice versa. Yet, the majority of the economic and finance literature has
overlooked this choice and its implications on financial market efficiency. This choice
could matter especially in the much studied context where the quality of potential
entrepreneurs' ventures is private information, since low quality project holders might
find it more profitable to give up their entrepreneurial aspirations and invest in the
projects of others. The defining feature of financial markets might be advantageous
rather than adverse selection.
The aim of this paper is to explore entrepreneurship and the functioning of
financial markets under asymmetric information when the roles of agents are
determined within the model. In a departure from most of the existing literature, all
agents in our model are capital constrained and have an investment project whose
quality is their private information. There is an occupational choice in the sense that
agents choose whether to participate in financial markets and, if they participate,
whether to become entrepreneurs or financiers. This creates a natural framework to
2study whether entrepreneurship, and by implication, a market for financial claims
emerge in equilibrium and whether the eventual markets are efficient.
We find that the financial market without outside financiers works remarkably
well despite asymmetric information and the absence of financial institutions
mitigating the asymmetric information problem: Pareto or interim efficient outcomes
prevail for a large set of parameter values for which partial equilibrium models would
predict an inefficient pooling equilibrium or even a collapse of the market. The
finding has an economic implication: importing finance from outside can decrease the
efficiency of a financial market.
Our model includes both economies where the total wealth is sufficient to
implement all projects with positive net present value, and wealth constrained
economies. In turns out that an aggregate shortage of liquidity matters. Pareto
efficient and inefficient equilibria exist both in wealth constrained and unconstrained
economies, as does autarky. Contrary to what one might expect, the economy-level
wealth constraint does not necessarily dilute the performance of the financial market.
When wealth is scarce relative to the economy's productive potential, agents with low
quality projects prefer financing agents with higher entrepreneurial potential to
investing in the projects of their own. Relaxing the wealth constraint can, however,
lower interest rates to the extent that it induces adverse selection since agents with
low quality projects begin to seek funding. This means that increasing wealth may
cause a shift from a Pareto efficient equilibrium into a Pareto inefficient one.
We build on the large and well-established literature on financial markets with
asymmetric information emerging from Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and
Webb (1987). In Section II we explore the role of entrepreneurs' wealth in a
conventional  set-up  with  outside  investors  and  replicate  some  key  results  of  the
3literature. If entrepreneurs are very poor so that those with low quality projects have
higher pledgeable incomes than high-quality project holders, a Stiglitz-Weiss type
financial market emerges where marginal entrepreneurs have productive projects. If
there is sufficient wealth to render the pledgeable incomes of high-quality
entrepreneurs higher than that of low-quality entrepreneurs, the market is of de Meza-
Webb type where marginal entrepreneurs have unproductive projects. There is too
much entrepreneurial activity and increases in wealth generate efficient exit from
entrepreneurship. When entrepreneurial wealth is very high, a Pareto efficient
separating equilibrium arises. Wealth thus acts akin to entrepreneurs' risk-aversion in
de Meza and Webb (1990).
In Section III we close the economy so that provision of entrepreneurial
finance becomes endogenous. All agents now encounter a choice between
entrepreneurship, financing others’ ventures, and remaining outside financial markets.
To the best of our knowledge, Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Shleifer and Wolfenzon
(2002) are the only studies besides ours where there is a genuine choice between
investing as an entrepreneur and a financier. Whereas the focus in Shleifer and
Wolfenzon (2002) has little to do with our analysis, Boyd and Prescott's model (1986)
is  close  to  ours.  There  are  agents  have  investment  projects  whose  quality  is  their
private information and who can choose whether to invest their endowment (of time)
in their project or evaluate the quality of a project. They show that if the agents form
intermediary-coalitions that evaluate projects, they can do better than in decentralized
markets.  Our  model  is  simpler  than  theirs  in  that  we  do  not  allow  for  financial
institutions that provide information. However, Boyd and Prescott (1986) focus on an
economy where the aggregate liquidity constraint is not binding. Indeed, in Section
III.A we provide an example which shows how the market outcome of Boyd and
4Prescott (1986) is a special case of our model. In many other cases – in particular
when aggregate liquidity constraint binds or agents are rich enough - there is no need
for information provision by financial institutions since the markets are efficient. We
also highlight the comparative statics over agents' initial wealth.1
In Section IV we, motivated by Holmström and Tirole (1998), consider
impacts of imperfect storage technology. Although the efficiency of storage has
trivially major effects on financial market participation, it has only minor effects on
efficiency, except that the scope of the Pareto efficient equilibrium in non-wealth
constrained economies is increasing in the efficiency of storage. At the limit where
there is no storage, the Pareto efficient equilibrium disappears.
Policy implications are collected into Section V. Our model is very stylized
and certainly does not correspond exactly to any real-world financial market
environment. Nonetheless, we feel that that our finding concerning the detrimental
effects of outside financiers and entrepreneurial wealth have important bearings on
two current policy debates. First, if financial market liberalization amounts to a large
inflow of funds from outside investors without a change in the composition of
potential entrepreneurs, it may have adverse consequences. That financial
liberalization can have a dark side is well known but most of the literature stresses
moral hazard as a major problem. In contrast, our explanation stems from adverse
selection and capital inflows. A similar point is elaborated by Giannetti (2005) and its
regulatory implications by Morrison and White (2004).
1 In Boyd and Prescott (1986), agents' (time) endowment is normalized to unity whereas their projects
have variable scale. As also shown by Boyd and Prescott,  however, variable scale is irrelevant in the
absence of financial intermediaries, since all executed projects have maximum scale regardless of their
type. There are some other differences, e.g., in Boyd and Prescott all projects are profitable gross of
project evaluation costs whereas in our case low quality projects have negative net present values.
5The second policy implication we want to raise concerns the promotion of
entrepreneurship. In our model wealth and entrepreneurial activity are generally
positively correlated, which is in line with existing evidence (e.g., Evans and
Jovanovic, 1989, and Black, de Meza and Jeffrey, 1996). Nonetheless, echoing the
argument forcefully advanced in the work of de Meza and Webb (1987, 1990, 1999),
we find that too low cost of capital attracts too many entrepreneurs and, as a result,
neither asymmetric information nor insufficient wealth necessarily provides a reason
to subsidize entrepreneurs or their finance.2 But here the conclusion emerges as part
of equilibrium when the agents' have intermediate wealth and the economy-level
wealth constraint does not bind. When it binds, increases in wealth cause entry of
productive entrepreneurs and a case for subsidizing business creation may arise.
Besides the aforementioned articles, our study is also inspired by Holmström
and Tirole (1997), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) and Aghion, Bacchetta, and
Banerjee (2004) who emphasize that both microeconomic and economy-wide
financial constraints influence the performance of financial markets. From this more
macroeconomic perspective our study has also a link to the emerging literature on the
impact of adverse selection over the business cycle (e.g., Eisfeldt, 2004, and House,
2006).
Finally, Section VI summarizes our findings.
II. THE MODEL WITH OUTSIDE INVESTORS
There is a unit mass of risk-neutral potential entrepreneurs who have access to a
project of size I, and unlimited entry by risk-neutral outside investors without a
project of their own. A proportion h (0<h<1) of potential entrepreneurs are high (H)
2 In our model excessive entrepreneurial activity can co-exist with a positive relationship between
wealth and entrepreneurship. This is the main point of de Meza and Webb (1999) but here the
coexistence arises without a need to introduce moral hazard considerations.
6types who are endowed with a positive NPV project, the rest are low (L) types with a
negative NPV project. The projects have two-point return distribution: we assume that
pHRH>I>pLRL and HL RR > , where pi is the success probability and Ri the return
(conditional on success) of an entrepreneur of type i, iÎ{H, L}. Failed projects yield
zero regardless of their type. Project success and wealth are verifiable, but project
type is private information following, e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).3
Potential entrepreneurs have some liquid funds A, 0<A<I, which they entirely
invest  either  in  their  own project  or  in  the  storage  technology.4 For  the  moment  we
assume that storage is perfect, converting initial wealth to consumption at a zero rate
of  return.  We  present  most  of  our  analysis  using  a  graph  in  the  (A, h)-space where
natural parameter boundaries are given by h<1, and A<I.
The financial market works as follows. First, potential entrepreneurs decide
whether to invest their initial funds in their project or in storage. If they initiate the
project, the rest of required funds (I-A) needs to be raised from outside investors.
Contract terms stipulate the conditional payment from the entrepreneur to outside
investors in case of success.5 Once financing needs have been settled, entrepreneurs
execute their projects. Successful entrepreneurs compensate outside investors
according to contract terms, and consumption takes place.
The potential entrepreneurs' individual rationality condition is given by
(1) ( ) ARRp Biiei ³-ºp i" , { }LHi ,Î ,
3 An alternative assumption used, e.g., in de Meza and Webb (1999) is that only payments from
entrepreneurs to financiers are verifiable and that entrepreneurs cannot hide income in case they
default.
4 It is cheaper for H-type entrepreneurs to use their own rather than outside funds. As a result, L-type
entrepreneurs have no other option but to follow and invest all their wealth in their own projects. See
de Meza and Webb (1987).
5 As there is no outside collateral in our model, introducing collateral into the contract does not change
the  final  wealth  of  an  entrepreneur  (of  either  type)  in  case  of  default:  This  is  zero  for  any  level  of
collateral. Collateral requirements cannot thus be used as a screening device in our model. As is well
7where superscript e denotes entrepreneurship so that eip  is  the  expected  profits  of  a
type i entrepreneur and RB is the (fixed) payment that a  successful entrepreneur pays
to her investors. Equation (1) shows how the potential entrepreneurs' wealth
determines the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship. The richer she is, the larger
should her expected payoff be to make entrepreneurship lucrative.
Because of competitive supply of finance, the cost of financing is determined
by outside investors’ zero-profit condition, i.e.,
(1)
p
AIRB
-
= ,
where p  is the average success probability of those who become entrepreneurs. From
(1) and (2) we observe four potential equilibrium outcomes. First, a Pareto efficient
separating equilibrium where only H-types become entrepreneurs ( p = pH), occurs if
e
L
e
H A pp >³ . Second, a Pareto inefficient pooling equilibrium where all potential
entrepreneurs also actually become entrepreneurs ( p = hpH+(1-h)pL), occurs if both
e
Hp  and
e
Lp  are larger than A. Third, there may be a semi-separating equilibrium
where all H-types are entrepreneurs, but L-types split with some becoming
entrepreneurs and others opting out of the financial market.6 In  this  case p =
[hpH+mL(1-h)pL]/[h+mL(1-h)] where mL denotes the proportion of L-types that become
entrepreneurs.7 Now L-types' indifference condition (1) and outside investors' zero
profit condition (2) give mL=h[pL(pHRL-I)-(pH-pL)A]/pL(1-h) and RB=(pLRL-A)/pL.
known, if collateral consisted of non-liquid (outside) wealth, such collateral would facilitate the
emergence of a separating equilibrium (see, e.g., Bester, 1987).
6 It is easy to show that a semi-separating equilibrium where H-types are indifferent between
entrepreneurship and using storage does not exist when outside finance is available.
7 Since there is a continuum of potential entrepreneurs, we model mixed strategies by a distributional
approach where the proportion mL of L-types use the pure strategy of becoming an entrepreneur and the
proportion 1-mL use the pure strategy of investing in storage.
8Finally, if both eHp  and
e
Lp  are smaller than A, the financial market does not open and
all agents invest in storage. We term this outcome autarky.
In Figure 1 we have depicted the (A, h)-values for which each of the four
different equilibria exist. The downward sloping line is H-types' IR constraint in the
pooling equilibrium and the upward sloping line is the corresponding constraint of L-
types. The L-types' IR constraint also divides the pooling and the semi-separating
equilibria so that mL=1 holds above the line and mL<1 below it. In the semi-separating
equilibrium, H-types' IR constraint is given by the vertical
)/()(ˆ LHHLHL ppRRppA --º -line, and the vertical
)/()()/()(ˆ LHLHLLHHHL ppIRppppIRppAA --=--+º -line is L-types' IR-
constraint. As a result, Figure 1 shows that the pooling equilibrium exists in the upper
part to the left of A  and above the IR constraints. Below the pooling case, autarky
prevails to the left of Aˆ  and the semi-separating equilibrium between Aˆ  and A . The
Pareto efficient equilibrium exists to the right of A .
FIGURE 1 HERE
The two vertical lines and the three regions they define will also be crucial in
the subsequent sections. On the one hand, the Pareto efficient equilibrium emerges for
A> A , since the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship rises with wealth. The
opportunity cost matters more for L-types, because the expected return on their
project is lower. The opportunity cost trivially exceeds L-type entrepreneurs' expected
profit when A³ LLRp  but, given the equilibrium RB>0, the L-type entrepreneurs'
expected profit is less than A in  the  whole  region  to  the  right  of LL RpA < . When
A? A ,  the  level  of  wealth  becomes  low  enough  to  tempt  L-types  to  bet  it  in  their
projects. Higher interest rates cannot be charged to prevent L-types from becoming
9entrepreneurs in competitive financial market. This suggests that if the supply of
finance was restricted, e.g., by a monopoly supplier, the economy could reach Pareto
efficiency also to the left of A . The suggestion will be confirmed in the next section.
On the other hand, financial markets have difficulties in opening up to the left of Â.
This observation has attracted much attention in the literature: As articulated by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the markets can collapse because of adverse selection.
The observation that financial markets and entrepreneurship generally emerge
when A³Â but not when A<Â can be explained by adopting the concept of pledgeable
income (Holmström and Tirole 1997, 1998), defined as the maximum amount of an
entrepreneur can promise to pay back to a financier. From (1) we see that the
pledgeable income of type i agent is given by Ri-A/pi. When potential entrepreneurs
are poor (A<Â), limited liability makes L-type entrepreneurs' pledgeable income
higher than that of H-types. Because L-types can always match the maximum
repayment that H-types are able to offer, adverse selection may lead to the collapse of
the financial market. But since increases in wealth raise L-types' liability more, the
pledgeable incomes of H- and L-type entrepreneurs are equal when A=Â and,  when
A>Â, H-types' pledgeable income exceeds that of L-types. There bad projects cannot
drive out good ones and financial markets can operate. In contrast, the inefficiency in
the middle area ( [ ],,ˆ AAAÎ ) is that there is too much entrepreneurship, as in de Meza
and Webb (1987).
To further relate our findings to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and de Meza and
Webb (1987), note that Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) consider a mean-preserving spread
between projects. Here it would mean that pHRH=pLRL and, consequently, L-type
entrepreneurs’ pledgeable income would always be higher than H-type entrepreneurs’,
like in the area to the left of Â in Figure 1. Similarly to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
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there could be underinvestment since insufficient wealth holds back H-type
entrepreneurs more easily. In this case the Pareto efficient equilibrium cannot exist.
De Meza and Webb (1987) in turn assume that the project returns conditional on
success are the same. Here it would mean that RH=RL and, consequently, Â=0. The
pledgeable income of H-type entrepreneurs would exceed that of L-type
entrepreneurs, as in the area to the right of Â in Figure 1. That area is characterized by
overinvestment. Increases in wealth cause efficient exit from entrepreneurship, since
marginal entrepreneurs (in the semi-separating equilibrium) are those of low quality.
We summarize the results of the model with outside investors in the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION 1: With outside investors,
a. When A³ A , the Pareto efficient separating equilibrium exists.
b. When A< A , the Pareto inefficient pooling equilibrium exists above the L-type
entrepreneurs’ IR constraint.
c. When Â<A< A , the Pareto inefficient semi-separating equilibrium exists
below the L-type entrepreneurs’ IR constraint.
d. When A<Â, the financial markets collapses to autarky below the H-type
entrepreneurs’ IR constraint.
e. When A<Â, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth (eventually) helps the
market out of autarky but when A>Â, it (eventually) leads to exit.
III. THE MODEL WITHOUT OUTSIDE INVESTORS
The absence of outside investors limits the amount of funds available for investment.
A natural consequence is that all agents face a choice between becoming
entrepreneurs or financiers. We regard an economy as wealth constrained if the total
initial wealth of all agents is insufficient to finance all H-types’ projects.
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Correspondingly, an economy is not wealth constrained if the total wealth exceeds the
financing needs of all H-type projects.
The financial market works as in the previous section. Since we allow no
financial institutions that gather and process information, the financial market in our
model could be interpreted as a frictionless (stock) market, a mutual fund, or a
microfinance institution. After the projects have been implemented, the total
payments from all entrepreneurs are divided evenly among all financiers. Thus it is as
if a financier buys a stake in the average implemented project, instead of
implementing her own project. Loosely speaking, it makes no difference whether one
envisions a financial market where some potential financiers come together to finance
one project (or a few projects), or a market where all financiers buy a similar stake in
every implemented project. Both result in the same expected payment to financiers.
The market collapses to autarky when all agents resort to the storage
technology and there are neither entrepreneurs nor financiers. In a Pareto efficient
allocation all or as many H-type projects as possible are financed whereas no L-type
projects receive finance. Correspondingly, in a Pareto inefficient equilibrium at least
some L-type projects are carried out.
Let us denote the proportion of type i agents that become entrepreneurs by im .
With [ ]1,0Îim , we have a 3x3 matrix of potential equilibria as shown in Table 1.8 It
is  immediately  clear  that  three  out  of  the  nine  cannot  exist.  If  no  H-type  agent
becomes an entrepreneur, the potential financiers’ individual rationality constraint is
violated. Similarly, due to our assumption that A<I, it is impossible that all agents
become entrepreneurs. The remaining six configurations cannot be excluded a priori.
They consist of autarky and five cases where financial markets emerge as an
8 These nine categories can be split further according to whether all type i agents participate or not.
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equilibrium outcome. We name the five potential equilibria with financial markets
according to what occupations (e = entrepreneur, f = financier, s =  user  of  storage
technology)  agents  of  type i choose. For example, fse LH  (column one, row one in
Table 1) is the equilibrium where all H-type agents become entrepreneurs, and L-
types split between becoming financiers and using storage.
TABLE 1 HERE
Both Pareto efficient equilibria are in the first column of Table 1. Of these, the
one in the last row is strictly better than the one in the middle row. Similarly, in the
middle column, the equilibrium in the last  row is more desirable than the one in the
middle row. The equilibrium in the last column is the worst of the five equilibria with
economic activity.
An equilibrium is now constrained by four conditions. The first arises from the
individual rationality (IR) constraints we saw in the previous section, with a slight but
crucial modification. Now all agents compare the expected profits from becoming
active, either as an entrepreneur or as a financier, investing in storage. The second set
of  conditions  comes  from  the  incentive  compatibility  (IC)  constraints  of  both  agent
types, which guide the choice between entrepreneurship and being a financier. The
third relationship equalizes the supply of funds from financiers with the demand of
funds by entrepreneurs. Finally, contract terms are determined by equating the
expected payments by successful entrepreneurs to the expected compensation for
financiers.
Denoting expected profits of a type i agent from activity j by jip , the IR
constraints are
(2) Aji ³p ji," , { }LHi ,Î , { }fej ,Î .
The IC constraints can be written as
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(4) ki
j
i pp ³ kji ,," , kj ¹ , { }LHi ,Î , { }fekj ,, Î .
Depending on the equilibrium (see Table 1) and agent type, the IC or IR constraint or
both may bind, and the IC constraint may hold strictly one way (e.g., all H-type agents
become entrepreneurs) or the other (e.g., all L-type agents become financiers).
The equality of demand and supply of funds is given by
(5) [ ] [ ])1)(1()1()1()( hhAhhAI LLHHLH ---+--=-+- cmcmmm ,
where im  and [ ]1,0Îic  denote the proportion of type i agents who become
entrepreneurs and who employ the storage technology. The left hand side of (5)
captures the demand. Each entrepreneur lacks I-A of funds to be able to carry out her
project and the term in the square brackets is the equilibrium mass of entrepreneurs. In
the right hand side of (5) we have the supply of funds from financiers, whose
equilibrium mass can be seen from the term in the square brackets.
Finally, the expected payments by entrepreneurs must equal the expected
payments received by financiers
(6) [ ] [ ])1)(1()1()1( hhRphhpR LLHHFLLHHB ---+--=-+ cmcmmm .
The term in the square brackets on the right-hand side of (6) is the equilibrium mass
of financiers as in (5), whereas the term on the left now equals the expected
equilibrium mass of successful entrepreneurs. In (6) RB is, as before, the fixed
payment an entrepreneur has promised to pay back in case of success, and RF is the
expected payment received by a financier.
Solving the range of parameters where conditions (3)-(6) hold for all five
equilibria with economic activity (see Table 1) is a straightforward but tedious
exercise. We consider the equilibrium efe LH as an example and then graphically
describe the remaining equilibria, relegating calculations to the Appendix.
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A. Example: efe LH
In efe LH , 1=Hm  and 10 << Lm , i.e., all H-type agents are entrepreneurs and L-type
agents become either entrepreneurs or financiers (i.e., nobody chooses the storage
technology, 0=ic , { }HLi ,Î ). This equilibrium corresponds to the decentralized
market equilibrium in Boyd and Prescott (1986) and is comparable to the semi-
separating equilibrium with outside financiers (Section II).9 As it turns out, this
equilibrium also displays plausible empirical implications and the de Meza-Webb
type results and policy recommendations. The example also illustrates one of our
main  results  of  how  a  decrease  in  initial  wealth  can  improve  the  efficiency  of  a
financial market.
Since financial market participation is complete in this equilibrium, we require
that both types' IR constraints are satisfied, i.e.,
(7) ARF ³ .
L-type agents’ IC constraint must hold with equality, which means that
(8) FBLL RRRp =- )( .
The left hand side gives the expected return for an L-type agent from becoming an
entrepreneur and the right hand side gives the expected return from becoming a
financier. As L-type agents split between the two occupations, they must be
indifferent between them.
Because all H-type agents prefer entrepreneurship to being financiers, their
expected return from entrepreneurship must be at least as large as that of becoming a
financier, i.e.,
9 The equilibrium efse LH (see Section A in the Appendix) perhaps corresponds even more accurately
to the semi-separating equilibrium of Section II. However, it is immaterial whether efse LH  or
efe LH  is chosen as a benchmark because, as we will show, they together span a smaller proportion of
the parameter space than the semi-separating equilibrium in the model with outside financiers.
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(9) FBHH RRRp ³- )( .
The aggregate demand and supply for finance is balanced when
(10) [ ] )1)(1()1()( hAhhAI LL --=-+- mm
holds.
Finally, the (expected) repayments from successful entrepreneurs must equal
the payments received by their financiers:
(11) [ ] )1)(1()1( hRphhpR LFLLHB --=-+ mm .
Conditions (8), (10) and (11) determine the endogenous variables Lm , BR , and
FR . Solving first for Lm  from (10) gives
(12)
Ih
hIA
L )1(
*
-
-
=m .
The proportion of L-types who become entrepreneurs has to be less than unity. This is
guaranteed by our assumption I>A. As *Lm  also has to be nonnegative in
efe LH , (12)
immediately reveals that efe LH can only exist if A/I ³ h. In other words, efe LH
cannot exist in a wealth constrained economy where the total wealth is insufficient to
finance all H-types’ projects.
Using (11), (10) and (7) we can solve for the equilibrium payments *BR  and
*
FR . They are given by
(13) [ ] LLLH
Rp
phhpI
AIR
B ))1(
)(*
-+
-
=  and
(14) [ ] LLLH
L
F RpphhpI
AIpR ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
-+
-
-=
))1(
)(
1* .
 Equations (13) and (14) suggest that for H-types, the payments *BR  and
*
FR  are
independent  of  project  outcome,  whereas  for  L-types  the  payments  are  functions  of
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project outcome. The payment from a successful L-type entrepreneur to her financier
is fixed, although in equilibrium, it is a function of her project return.
After solving for the endogenous variables, we still need to find the parameter
values  satisfying  the  agents'  IR  and  IC constraints  (7)-(9).  The  L-type  IC constraint
(8)  binds  as  they  split  in  their  occupational  choices.  Since  H-types  prefer
entrepreneurship to becoming financiers, and being a financier is at least as rewarding
as investing in storage, their IR constraint (7) does not bind. This means that the
relevant constraints are the IR constraint (7) for L-types and the H-type IC constraint
(9). Substituting (14) into (7) shows that the L-type IR constraint is satisfied
(guaranteeing that no L-type agent stores her wealth) if
(15) ( )LLLLH
LHLL
RpIpppIh
ppIhRpA
-+-
-
£
)(
)( .
The H-type IC constraint (guaranteeing that no H-type agent prefers becoming a
financier to entrepreneurship) is satisfied if
(16)
[ ]
LLLH
LHLLHH
Rppp
phhpIRpRpIA
)(
))1()(
-
-+-
-³ .
In Figure 2 we use the (A, h)-space to represent the set of parameter values for
which efe LH  exists.
FIGURE 2 HERE
The h=A/I diagonal divides economies into wealth constrained (above), and non-
wealth constrained ones (below). efe LH  only exists in non-wealth constrained
economies as suggested by (12). There L-types’ IC constraint binds, whereas H-types’
IR constraint  does not.  H-types’ IC constraint  (16) is  a decreasing line in the (A, h)-
space so that poor economies with a small proportion of good projects fail to satisfy
this constraint. L-types’ IR constraint (15) is a monotonically increasing curve that
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starts at the origin and cuts the diagonal once. Below the curve, some L-types prefer
not to participate.
Let us consider how a decrease in wealth affects the equilibrium in Figure 2.
Decreasing A reduces the funds available to entrepreneurs. Because of the tightened
financial market, *BR  increases, meaning that entrepreneurs are worse off. Since in this
equilibrium H-types prefer entrepreneurship to becoming a financier and L-types are
indifferent, any marginal change in A has a first-order impact on L-types’
occupational choice, but H-types continue to be entrepreneurs. Therefore, exit from
entrepreneurship occurs ( *Lm  declines). From a financier's point of view, the
improvement in the quality of entrepreneurial pool and the increase in the lending rate
increase her payoff. However, a decline in *Lm  also  means  that  the  ratio  of
entrepreneurs to financiers diminishes, driving financiers' returns downwards to the
extent that the net result is a lower payoff per financier ( *FR ). Hence, decreasing A
dilutes the payoff from both entrepreneurship and finance. By definition, L-types
remain indifferent, but H-types' returns to entrepreneurship wane relatively faster.
If A continues to decrease, it will inevitably also affect H-types’ actions. Thus
the outcome depends on the proportion of H-types in the economy. If the proportion is
sufficiently high, the financial market will eventually run out of funds. When this
happens, all L-types are financiers. In terms of Figure 2, we hit the 0* ³Lm  constraint,
and some H-types must also become financiers. The new equilibrium is Pareto
efficient. If the proportion of H-types in the market is sufficiently low, however, there
is less risk of running out of funds. Therefore H-types' IC constraint (the downward
sloping line in Figure 2) is breached before the 0* ³Lm  constraint. This will cause an
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abrupt drop in the average quality of entrepreneurs, leading to a collapse of the
market.
The example suggests a role of financial intermediaries that would mitigate the
asymmetric information problem. Based on Boyd and Prescott (1986), we conjecture
that such intermediaries would emerge if agents had access to a project evaluation
technology. Our focus is however on the effects of wealth. The example illustrates
how a decrease in wealth tightens the financial market, which is beneficial from the
efficiency point of view. The underlying reason is the same as in de Meza and Webb
(1987): marginal entrepreneurs are of low quality and can be driven out by higher
interest rates. A major difference to de Meza and Webb (1987) is that here the
problem of overinvestment emerges as part of equilibrium: the economy's total initial
wealth relative to the proportion of high quality projects is too large. Moreover, there
is a positive relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship. This is at odds with
the prediction of de Meza and Webb (1987) but has empirical appeal.10 In the next
Section we describe the all equilibria of the economy and show that interest rates can
sometimes be endogenously high enough to discourage L-types from becoming
entrepreneurs.
B. Existence and Efficiency of Equilibria
Following a similar procedure as for the case of HeLef in Section III.A., we derive in
the Appendix the values of the endogenous variables and determine the conditions for
the existence of the six candidate equilibria. Here we present graphically the equilibria
10 De Meza and Webb (1999) add moral hazard to their basic framework to generate a positive
relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship. Our example shows that one does not need moral
hazard considerations to obtain the de Meza-Webb type results and policy recommendations while
maintaining the empirically plausible relationship between wealth and business creation.
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and describe their efficiency properties. At the end of the Section, we summarize our
main results and explain them.
In Figure 3, we employ the labeling of Table 1 to indicate the areas in which
each equilibrium exists in the (A, h)-space.11 There  are  two  key  lines:  the h=A/I
diagonal and the vertical )/()(ˆ LHHLHL ppRRppA --º -line, familiar from Section
II. The diagonal not only divides the economies into wealth and non-wealth
constrained ones, but is also a border of various equilibria in many cases. To the right
of the vertical Â-line the equilibria are unique.
FIGURE 3 HERE
Let us first examine non-wealth constrained economies, i.e., those below the
diagonal in Figure 3. Because there is no aggregate shortage of liquidity, this region
has similarities to the case of outside finance of Section II. Corresponding to the
Pareto efficient separating equilibrium with outside finance (see Figure 1), we find a
Pareto efficient equilibrium, fse LH , in the right part of Figure 3. All H-type projects
are financed, and L-types are indifferent between financing the H-types and using the
storage technology. On the right hand side of the vertical pLRL-line, L-types prefer
investing in storage to entrepreneurship by assumption. Because of costly financing
(RB*>0),  L-types  continue  to  find  storage  superior  some  distance  to  the  left  of  the
pLRL-line.
Going further to the left, once we hit the vertical A -line, a Pareto inefficient
semi-separating equilibrium, efse LH , emerges much as in the case of outside finance.
All H-type agents are entrepreneurs, but so are some L-type agents. Below the L-type
IR-curve (equation (15)), the L-type participation constraint is satisfied with equality
through some L-types opting for storage. Above the L-type IR-curve, we have the
11 In the Appendix, we present a separate figure for each equilibrium.
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Pareto inefficient equilibrium efe LH  that  was  characterized  in  Section  III.A.  All  L-
type agents participate and thus nobody uses storage even though available assets
exceed the financing needs of H-type entrepreneurs. Demand and supply of funds is
equated through some L-type agents becoming entrepreneurs. H-type entrepreneurs’
IC (and IR) constraint is given by (16). Autarky prevails to the left of it.
We then turn to wealth-constrained economies, i.e., the area above the
diagonal in Figure 3. Here the contrast with the case of outside finance is stark. In the
middle and right part we find relatively rich economies with a high proportion of H-
types. There, an equilibrium exists where all L-types become financiers, and H-types
mix in their occupations between entrepreneurship and finance ( fef LH ). All funds
are directed into H-type projects, and therefore the equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
Moving to the left, entrepreneurship becomes an option to L-types when we
reach the vertical Â-line. Between it and another vertical line, Â(I/pHRH), we have one
to three equilibria in the upper part of Figure 3. One is the same fef LH as on the right
hand side of that line. Another is efef LH where both L- and H-types can be found
among entrepreneurs and financiers. The third equilibrium is eef LH  where all L-types
are entrepreneurs and H-types mix their occupations between entrepreneurship and
being a financier. Since there are L-type agents among entrepreneurs in efef LH and
eef LH , they are Pareto inferior to fef LH .
Once we cross Â(I/pHRH) financial markets cease to operate except for a small
area close to the h=1 border. There we find eef LH  where all L-types are
entrepreneurs. Although the equilibrium is inefficient, it survives thanks to a very
high proportion of H-type entrepreneurs. The lower is the agents’ wealth, the higher
the needed proportion of H-type agents to avoid the collapse of the financial market.
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To conclude the discussion on the efficiency of equilibria, we investigate whether
the Pareto inefficient equilibria are interim (incentive) efficient in the sense of
Holmström and Myerson (1983).12 In the non-wealth constrained economies the
equilibria efe LH  and efse LH  are  not  interim  efficient.  The  social  planner  could
achieve efficiency, albeit not a Pareto improvement, by imposing a high enough BR
( BR = ( ) LLL pARp /- ) or otherwise taxing entrepreneurial profits or subsidizing
inactivity. This would work because in this region the pledgeable income of H-type
agents  is  higher  than  that  of  L-type  agents.  In  wealth-constrained  economies  the
equilibria efef LH and eef LH  cannot be interim efficient to the right of Â(I/pHRH)
because the Pareto efficient fef LH exists there. To the left of Â(I/pHRH), a social
planner cannot simultaneously discourage L-type entrepreneurship and encourage H-
type entrepreneurship as the pledgeable income of L-types is much larger than that of
H-type agents.13
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 2: Without outside investors,
a. equilibria are typically unique: multiple equilibria can only exist in an area
shaped by Â(I/pHRH), Â, (16) and (D.20) (see the Appendix for (D.20),
b. the unique equilibrium is autarky if the level of initial wealth is sufficiently low
and Pareto efficient if the level of initial wealth is sufficiently high,
12 Loosely, in an interim incentive efficient equilibrium a benevolent social planner encountering the
same informational imperfections as the individual agents cannot improve upon the market outcome
without violating the agents’ individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints.
13 If the social planner were allowed to dictate the agents' occupations, efficiency could also be
improved in some other cases. In the region to the left of Â(I/pHRH), the planner could raise efficiency
by randomly allocating agents into entrepreneurship. This would be feasible when
( ) ( )LLHHLL RpRpRpIh --³ / . Improvement on autarky would be possible between Â(I/pHRH) and
Â and below (15), if the social planner could force some agents to use storage. With positive
probability, a high-enough proportion of L-type agents would using storage, pushing the proportion of
H-type agents in the active population above the threshold (A/I) needed to obtain economic activity.
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c. in the intermediate range of initial wealth, both Pareto efficient and inefficient
equilibria exist,
d. the Pareto inefficient equilibria with active financial markets are not interim
efficient in the intermediate range of initial wealth, and
e. the threshold levels of wealth that prevent the market from collapsing to
autarky and yield a Pareto efficient equilibrium are higher in a non-wealth
constrained economy than in a wealth constrained one.
Although parts a-d) of Proposition 2 apply both to wealth and non-wealth
constrained economies, we emphasize that the aggregate wealth constraint matters.
Most clearly this can be seen from part e) of Proposition 2: in wealth constrained
economies A ³ Â is a sufficient condition for a Pareto efficient equilibrium whereas in
non-wealth constrained economies it is only a sufficient condition to avoid a collapse
of the market to autarky.
That the equilibria are typically more efficient when the aggregate wealth
constraint binds suggests that opening up the financial market to outside investors
might have adverse efficiency effects. Indeed, a comparison of Figures 1 and 3 reveals
striking findings: Only to the right of A  outside finance dominates over endogenous
finance, because in wealth constrained economies, outside finance allows the
execution of all positive NPV projects. In non-wealth constrained economies, the
equilibria coincide. To the left of A , outside finance reduces the efficiency apart from
the upper left hand corner where the equilibrium eef LH  prevails. We obtain the
following result:
PROPOSITION 3:
a.  When A < Â(I/pHRH)  and  A > A  the outcome with outside investors weakly
Pareto dominates the outcome without outside investors.
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b. When A Î [Â(I/pHRH), Â], the outcomes without outside investors Pareto
dominate the outcomes with outside investors if equilibrium fef LH  prevails.
c. When A Î [Â, A ], the outcomes without outside investors Pareto dominate the
outcomes with outside investors.
In other words, only if the economy is very poor (A < Â(I/pHRH) or very rich
(A > A ), opening up the financial markets to outside investors may yield efficiency
gains.  In  the  intermediate  range  of  wealth,  allowing  outside  finance  can  reduce  the
efficiency of the financial markets: With outside finance, the equilibrium is an
inefficient pooling or semi-separating equilibrium while without, the equilibrium may
even be Pareto efficient.
The difference in the two cases lies in the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship.
Without outside financiers, all agents cannot be entrepreneurs. The relative scarcity of
funds raises the interest rates and the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship. This makes
entrepreneurship less attractive, particularly in wealth constrained economies. When
A>Â, the H-type entrepreneurs’ pledgeable income exceeds the one of the L-type
entrepreneurs. In such an environment the higher opportunity costs discourages
foremost L-type entrepreneurs, improving the quality of the entrepreneurial pool. The
same logic does not apply when A £ Â, because there the pledgeable income of L-type
entrepreneurs is higher. The higher opportunity cost first affects H-types’ choice,
causing an adverse effect on the average quality of entrepreneurs. In wealth
constrained economies the efficient HefLf equilibrium can nonetheless be supported for
some  parameter  values,  since  the  high  quality  of  the  entrepreneurial  pool  raises  the
returns on finance sufficiently to keep L-types as financiers.
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C. Wealth and Entrepreneurship
Proposition 3 shows some efficiency effects of wealth, but removing outside
financiers also affects the way wealth and entrepreneurship is linked. As expected, the
link in non-wealth constrained economies has similarities with the case of outside
finance: when A<Â, insufficient wealth suppresses entrepreneurial activity because it
leads to autarky, and when A³Â, increases in wealth cause efficient exit of L-type
entrepreneurs in equilibrium efse LH . However, as the example of Section III.A shows,
increases in wealth stimulates inefficient entry of L-type entrepreneurs in equilibrium
efe LH .
In wealth constrained economies the relationship between wealth and
entrepreneurship is quite different: in all equilibria except efef LH , wealth is positively
associated with efficient entry of H-type entrepreneurs. In efef LH  H-type
entrepreneurs are replaced by L-types as wealth rises. The aggregate amount of
entrepreneurship in efef LH is nonetheless increasing in wealth.
 The relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship can succinctly be
written as follows:
PROPOSITION 4: Wealth and entrepreneurship are (weakly) negatively correlated
only if storage is used. Otherwise, they are (weakly) positively correlated.
The negative relationship between wealth and entrepreneurship arises only if some
agents invest in storage also in the case of outside finance. But there storage is used
for a much wider range of parameter values. Moreover, with outside financiers,
increases in wealth cannot lead to entry of H-type entrepreneurs once the financial
markets open up.14
14The wealth constraint also affects the distribution of economic rents: In a wealth constrained
economy, L-types earn rents, whereas H-types earn rents if the aggregate wealth constraint does not
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IV. IMPERFECT STORAGE TECHNOLOGY
So far we have assumed an exogenous storage technology that fully converts the
initial liquid assets to consumption goods. This assumption, while standard, is not
realistic. For example, poor people in developing countries have no safe storing place
and they need invest whatever extra liquid funds they have in livestock that may die,
in jewellery that may be stolen, etc. In the richer world, available storage technologies
such as cash are generally better but their efficiency hinges on the stability of
monetary policy. Moreover, the assumption is not necessarily harmless. For instance,
removing the storage technology eliminates bank runs in Diamond and Dybvig's
(1983) model and its variations.
To  verify  whether  our  findings  are  sensitive  to  the  efficiency  of  the  storage
technology, we now assume that storage is imperfect so that A depreciates at rate 1-d,
dÎ[0,1]. The only difference to the previous model is that the agents' IR constraints
(3) should be rewritten as
(17) Aji dp ³ ji," , { }LHi ,Î , { }fej ,Î .
When d is  close  to  unity,  our  previous  analysis  is  robust  to  the  introduction  of
imperfect storage by continuity. As one might expect, however, the equilibria will
change if d becomes small, because all agents are willing to invest either as financiers
or as entrepreneurs even if their returns are small. To get an idea of the changes, let us
reconsider the example of Section III.A ( efe LH ). To guarantee that all agents
participate, we require that
bind. H-types only earn rents as entrepreneurs, but L-types may earn them also as financiers. The rents
are studied in more detail in the discussion paper version (HECER DP, 2006).
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(18) ARF d³ .
All other equations remain unchanged except that the L-type IR constraint (15)
now takes the form
(19) ( )LLLLH
LHLL
RpIpppIh
ppIhRpA
-+-
-
£
d)(
)( .
When d is close to unity, (19) remains a monotonically increasing curve in the (A, h)-
space. Decreasing d shifts  the  curve  to  the  right,  increasing  the  range  of  parameters
where HeLef exists. It can be shown that when d approaches zero, HeLef exists for all
parameter values in the non-wealth constrained region in so far as H-types' IC
constraint (16) holds. This is quite natural, since without storage, the L-types' IR
constraint is trivially satisfied.
For the rest of the section we focus on the case when d=0. Besides shortening the
discussion, letting d=0 generalizes our model. When the agents no longer have an
access to an exogenous storage technology, investing either as an entrepreneur or as a
financier becomes the only way to transfer initial wealth to a consumption good.
Although our model lacks a second investment period, the exercise is similar in spirit
to Holmström and Tirole (1998) who evaluate whether financial markets alone are
able to supply enough liquidity and transform wealth over time.
FIGURE 4 HERE
The  results  of  this  exercise  are  summarized  in  Figure  4  (the  calculations  are
available upon request). The equilibria HeLfs and HeLefs, where storage is a viable
option in the basic model with d=1, cease to exist. Instead, HeLef, HefLef and HefLe exist
for larger parameter value ranges. HefLf remains unchanged. The largest change in
efficiency occurs in non-wealth constrained economies for A> A ,  where  the
inefficient HeLef exists instead of the efficient HeLfs.  As  a  result,  only  Pareto
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inefficient equilibria exist in non-wealth constrained economies. Without storage, L-
types are certain to invest either as entrepreneurs or as financiers. Once the needs of
all H-type entrepreneurs are satisfied, it is impossible to prevent the remaining L-
types from splitting between entrepreneurship and financiership. For A£ A , removing
storage causes only modest changes to financial market performance, suggesting that
financial markets alone can take care of transformation of wealth.
V.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Though there are several limitations15 to our simple model, we boldly offer some
policy recommendations. The first deals with financial market liberalization. If
financial market liberalization means the introduction of outside investors without
projects of their own, the predictions are rather clear. Liberalization can help a very
poor country from autarky and generate a Pareto efficient separating equilibrium in a
rich country. But liberalization is likely to result in a deterioration of entrepreneurial
quality and the performance of financial markets in countries with medium initial
wealth (compare the middle sections of Figures 1 and 3).16
Our findings also have implications on widely adopted policies that seek to
promote entrepreneurship (see, e.g., European Commission, 2001). These policies are
often motivated by the observation that personal wealth facilitates entrepreneurship.
Although designing an optimal budget-balancing tax-subsidy policy is beyond the
scope of our study, our findings can be read to support the findings of de Meza and
Webb (1987 and 1999) who argue that neither asymmetric information nor
15 For instance, future work should consider more than two types of agents, heterogeneity in agents’
wealth, non-Walrasian market clearing, and more dynamic environment. In particular, we think that
paying closer attention to coalition formation and the effect of creditor concentration on financial
market efficiency in an equilibrium model of entrepreneurship and financial markets is a promising
avenue for further research. Advances in this direction are made by Bris and Welch (2005).
16 This is reminiscent of Aghion et al. (2004) where financial market liberalization destabilizes an
economy at an intermediate level of financial development which, in their model, is directly related to
the initial wealth of the economy.
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insufficient wealth is necessarily a reason to subsidize entrepreneurs or their finance.17
In our model this conclusion follows in particular if the aggregate wealth constraint of
an economy is not binding. In that case, there is too much lending and
entrepreneurship for a wide range of parameter values. This applies even if business
creation is increasing in the level of wealth. The less efficient is the storage
technology, the larger is the parameter space where entrepreneurial activity is
excessive in spite of the positive correlation between wealth and entrepreneurship.
However, a caveat should be borne in mind: in wealth constrained economies
insufficient wealth can hold back productive entrepreneurs and a case for subsidies
may arise. Encouraging entrepreneurship by making finance cheaper can also work if
the economy is very poor and the market for entrepreneurial finance does not
otherwise open up.
Another straightforward “policy experiment” concerning promotion of
entrepreneurship is to move the vertical )/()( LHLHL ppIRppA --º -line to left.
This increases the set of parameter values for which a Pareto efficient equilibrium
exists in non-wealth constrained economies. Our experiment suggests that if
entrepreneurship policies such as education and advice unconditionally raise the
success probabilities or returns on successful projects without upgrading the L-type
projects to positive NPV projects, they may be misguided.
As the discussion on wealth and entrepreneurship in Section III.A shows, shocks
to model parameters change the values of the endogenous variables even if the
equilibrium type remains the same as before the shock. When the parameters initially
are close to a border, even small shocks may change the type of equilibrium. A
17 The optimal tax-subsidy policies in the market for entrepreneurial finance under asymmetric
information are elaborated by Boadway and Keen (2005). Their results are consistent with our claim
here.
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decrease in initial wealth may shift the economy from a Pareto efficient equilibrium to
an inefficient one (e.g., from fse LH  to efse LH ), or even to autarky (e.g., from fef LH
to autarky). But in our model also an increase in wealth may reduce efficiency:
Increasing wealth may move an economy from a Pareto efficient fef LH equilibrium
to an inefficient efe LH  (from  point  1  to  point  2  in  Figure  3).  However,  increasing
wealth is an effective tool in raising an economy out of autarky.
Finally, let us consider the role for financial intermediaries that collect and
analyze information. There is no need for such financial institutions in the Pareto
efficient equilibria. However, Pareto improving financial intermediary-coalitions
could arise in equilibrium efe LH , as indicated by Boyd and Prescott (1986).
Extending the insights from Boyd and Prescott (1986) beyond efe LH , financial
intermediaries could improve upon the market equilibrium when we have low initial
wealth (autarky), moderate initial wealth if efef LH  prevails, or moderate to high
initial wealth in a non-wealth constrained economy ( efe LH  and efse LH ). The welfare-
enhancing prospects of financial intermediaries further increase if the storage
technology is inefficient (i.e., when d is small).
Perhaps the most surprising rationale for financial intermediaries with market
power comes from the observation that competitive financial markets can drive
interest rates too low from an efficiency point of view. As in de Meza and Webb
(1987), we show in Section II how competition between outside financiers results in
the oversupply of funds for a wide range of parameter values. With endogenous
finance, such overinvestment occurs in non-wealth constrained economies, generating
the inefficient equilibria HeLef and HeLefs.
These results concerning entrepreneurship policy, the role of initial wealth and the
need of financial intermediaries under an inefficient storage technology all support the
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notion that the creation of microfinance institutions might be a less wasteful
antipoverty tactic than development aid, debt forgiveness or artificially making credit
to poor cheaper, e.g., via loan rate regulation.18
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we study whether, despite asymmetric information and capital
constraints, the markets for entrepreneurial finance can endogenously emerge in
equilibrium,  and  the  efficiency  of  the  eventual  markets.  In  our  model  all  agents
encounter capital constraints but can choose whether they invest in their own project
or finance others' ventures. In the usual partial equilibrium setting the only equilibria
are autarky without financial markets and entrepreneurship, and a Pareto inefficient
pooling equilibrium. We first show that a Pareto efficient separating equilibrium
arises, if potential entrepreneurs are sufficiently rich, whereas a semi-separating
Pareto inefficient equilibrium exists under intermediate entrepreneurial wealth.
We then exclude outside investors and find that the market for entrepreneurial
finance continues to work. If anything, the market works more efficiently than with
outside finance: a Pareto efficient equilibrium emerges in a wealth constrained
economy  for  a  wide  range  of  parameter  values  where  inefficient  equilibria
characterize the market with outside finance. We also find that in many cases business
creation  rises  with  wealth  but  this  does  not  necessarily  rationalize  subsidies  to
entrepreneurs or their financiers. While these results are similar in spirit to de Meza
and Webb (1987, 1990, 1999) who argue that a major concern in the markets for
entrepreneurial finance is overinvestment, we also identify circumstances where
business creation should be subsidized.
18 See Eeckhout and Munshi (2005) for the effects of interest rate regulation on microfinance.
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 Our findings differ from the conventional wisdom derived from partial
equilibrium models. The findings suggest that, in the face of asymmetric information,
the simplest type of financial markets may perform their role in resource allocation
and asset transformation well, and that while increasing the proportion of high-quality
entrepreneurs is a remedy for removing inefficiency, injecting capital into the market
may not be.
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Table 1
TYPES OF EQUILIBRIA
0=Lm 10 << Lm 1=Lm
0=Hm AUTARKY Not possible Not possible
10 << Hm fef LH efef LH eef LH
1=Hm fse LH efe LH , efse LH Not possible
Notes:
mi = the proportion of i type agents that become entrepreneurs in equilibrium.
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Figure 1
L-type IR??L<1
H-type IR
Â A
Pareto inefficient pooling
equilibrium
Pareto efficient
separating
equilibrium
Pareto inefficient semi-
separating equilibrium
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L-type IR
 (14)
H-type IC (15)
h=1
Figure 2   (HeLef)
mL* > 0 (11)
I          A
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Superscript e = entrepreneurship
f = financiers
s = storage technology
Pareto efficient
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Pareto inefficient
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APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we go through all possible equilibria besides autarky. For each equilibrium, we
present
- the constraints,
- the equilibrium values of endogenous variables, and
- the equilibrium existence conditions.
We shorten the exposition by using the following notation: Dp=pH-pL, DR=RL-RH, g=pHRH-I, l=I-pLRL,
and DW=g+l=pHRH-pLRL. The definitions have obvious interpretations. Since our approach to solve the
model is rather mechanical, we explain the solution for the first equilibrium in more detail than for the
subsequent equilibria. We also omit intermediate steps as these are straightforward (albeit sometimes
tedious).
A. efe LH  and efse LH
efe LH  is described in the example in Section III.A, so we first define efse LH and then merely
characterize its relation to efe LH . In efse LH , all H-types are entrepreneurs and L-types are
indifferent among entrepreneurship, financing, and using the storage technology, i.e., 1=Hm ,
( )1,0ÎLm , cH=0, and ( )1,0ÎLc . The situation here is otherwise similar to efe LH described in
Section III.A. except that cL is strictly positive. This means that (7) must hold as an equality, i.e.,
ARF = . "L- and H-type IR" (A.1)
The agents’ IC constraints are as before in (7) and (9), i.e.,
FBLL RRRp =- )( . "L-type IC" (A.2)
FBHH RRRp ³- )( . "H-type IC" (A.3)
The economy level “budget constraint” (10) becomes
[ ] )()1()1)(1( AIhhAh LLL --+=--- mcm (A.4)
"Equality of supply and demand for funds"
and, similarly, the financial market equilibrium condition (11) is
[ ] )1)(1()1( hRRphhp LLFBLLH ---=-+ cmm . (A.5)
"Financial market transactions"
Conditions (A.1)-(A.5) constrains efse LH . Equation (A.3) restricts the range of parameters and an
equation system consisting of (A.1), (A.2), (A.4) and (A.5) determines the values of the endogenous
variables RB, RF, cL, and mL. The equilibrium value of the expected payment received by financier, RF*,
equals A by (A.1). Then, solving (A.1) and (A.2) for RB gives
L
LL
p
ARpR
B
-
=* . (A.6)
Upon substituting (A.1) and (A.6) into (A.5) we have two equations, (A.4) and (A.5), that determine
the remaining two endogenous variables, cL, and mL. After somewhat involved algebra they can be
written as
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, (A.8)
where the last equalities come from (A.6).
The equilibrium exists if cL* and mL* given by (A.7) and (A.8) satisfy our initial assumptions
( )1,0ÎLm  and ( )1,0ÎLc , and if the agents' IC and IR constraints are satisfied with RB* given by
(A.6). The first four existence conditions are
1* <Lm Û ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
D
->
ph
RpA LL
l
, (A.9)
0* >Lm Û Ap
pA
p
RpA LLL =D
+=÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ
D
-<
gl ˆ , (A.10)
1* <Lc Û
LLH
LL
L
LL
RpIp
pIRp
ppI
pIRpA 2-
D
=
+D
D
<
l
, (A.11)
and
0* >Lc Û ( ) LLL
LL
L
LL
RpphpI
pIhRp
ppIh
pIhRpA 2-D+
D
=
+D
D
>
l
. (A.12)
Since L-type IC and IR bind by (A.1) and (A.2), the fifth existence condition comes from H-type IC
(A.3). If it is satisfied, H-type IR (A.1) also trivially holds. Inserting (A.1) and (A.6) into (A.3) shows
that H-type IC holds if
AA ˆ³ . (A.13)
Equations (A.9)-(A.13) define the range of parameters for which efse LH exists. Since the critical
values of A in (A.11) and (A.12) are strictly larger than the respective critical values in (A.10) and
(A.9), the binding critical values are given by (A.10) and (A.12). They in turn cross each other at the
diagonal h=A/I. This means that efse LH  only exists in non-wealth constrained economies. In terms of
the (A, h)-space, efse LH  exists in the area between the vertical lines (A.13) and (A.10), and below the
curve (A.12), as depicted in Figure A.1.
FIGURE A.1 HERE
When (A.12) (which is identical to equation (15)) is violated, the H-type IC changes from
(A.13) to (16), i.e., to ( ) LLL RppphpWIIA DD+D-³ . Thus, efe LH  exists in the range of
parameters described in Section III.A., i.e., in the area shaped by curve (A.12), the downward sloping
line (16) and h=A/I diagonal. Note also that curve (A.12), the vertical Â line and the downward sloping
line cross at the same point where
WI
Ahh
D
º=
lˆ
1 .
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B. fef LH  and fsefs LH
We first prove that fsefs LH  cannot exist. In this equilibrium )1,0(ÎHm , 0=Lm  and both cH and
cL Î (0,1). The equilibrium is constrained by the following five conditions:
ARF ³ . "L- and H-type IR" (B.1)
FBLL RRRp £- )( , "L-type IC" (B.2)
FBHH RRRp =- )( , "H-type IC" (B.3)
[ ] )()1)(1()1( AIhAhh HLHH -=--+-- mccm , (B.4)
"Equality of supply and demand for funds."
and
[ ][ ])1)(1()1( hhRRph LHHFBHH --+--= ccmm . (B.5)
"Financial market transactions"
In fsefs LH (B.1) holds with equality.  Solving (B.4) for mH yields
[ ])1(1 hh
hI
A
LHH
---= ccm (B.6)
Using (B.3) and (B.6) in (B.5) yields RB as
I
AIRR H
B
)(* -= . (B.7)
Inserting (B.7) back into (B.3) gives
I
ARpR HHF =
* . (B.8)
Since RF* in (B.8) is strictly larger than A, the initial assumption (B.1) that the agents’ IR constraints
bind is invalid. This means that the equilibrium cannot exist for positive cH  and cL.
fef LH  can be characterized by setting cH =cL=0 in (B.6). This means that
hI
A
H =
*m . (B.9)
Equation (B.9) gives two equilibrium existence conditions:
1* <Hm Û hIA < , (B.10)
and
0* >Hm Û 0>A . (B.11)
By means of (B.7) and (B.8) the third existence condition, the L-type IC constraint (B.2), can be
written as
A
Rp
IA
HH
ˆ³ . (B.12)
Equations (B.10)-(B.12) define the range of parameters for which fef LH  exists. As shown in Figure
A.2, the equilibrium exists in wealth constrained economies for AÎ[ÂI/pHRH, I).
FIGURE A.2 HERE
41
C. fse LH
In this equilibrium, 1=Hm , 0=Lm , cH=0 and cLÎ(0,1). In words, all H-types are entrepreneurs and
L-types are either financiers or use the storage technology. The five basic conditions constraining the
equilibrium are
ARF = , "L-type IR" (C.1)
FBLL RRRp £- )( , "L-type IC" (C.2)
FBHH RRRp ³- )( , "H-type IC and IR" (C.3)
)()1)(1( AIhAhL -=-- c , (C.4)
"Equality of supply and demand for funds"
and
)1)(1( hRRhp LFBH --= c . (C.5)
"Financial market transactions"
The equilibrium value of RF trivially equals A by (C.1). By substituting (C.1) into (C.5), the
other endogenous variables, cL, and RB, can be solved from (C.4) and (C.5). They are given by
)1(
*
hA
hIA
L -
-
=c (C.6)
and
Hp
AIR
B
-
=* . (C.7)
From (C.6) we see that *Lc <1 by assumption A<I. Similarly, inserting (C.1) and (C.7) into (C.3) shows
that H-types' IC and IR constraints are equivalent to pHRH>I which holds by assumption. Thus,
fse LH
is defined by two existence conditions. First,
0* ³Lc Û hIA ³ (C.9)
must hold. Second, the L-type IC constraint (C.2) must hold. Employing (C.1) and (C.7), it can be
rewritten as
A
p
pAA L =
D
+³
gˆ , (C.10)
where the right hand side equals (A.10). Equations (C.9) and (C.10) show that fse LH only exists in
non-wealth constrained economies for AÎ[Â + pLg/Dp, I) (see Figure A.3).
FIGURE A.3 HERE
D. eef LH  and eefs LH
We first prove that eefs LH  cannot exist. The set-up of eefs LH  practically mirrors efse LH of Section
A of the Appendix, because here ( )1,0ÎHm , 1=Lm , ( )1,0ÎHc  and cL=0. In words, all L-types
are entrepreneurs, and H-types are indifferent between entrepreneurship, financing, and using the
storage technology. The five basic constraints in eefs LH are
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ARF = , "L- and H-type IR" (D.1)
FBLL RRRp ³- )( , "L-type IC" (D.2)
FBHH RRRp =- )( , "H-type IC" (D.3)
[ ] )(1)1( AIhhhA HHH -+-=-- mcm , (D.4)
"Equality of supply and demand for funds",
and
[ ] hRRphph HHFBLHH )1()1( cmm --=-+ . (D.5)
"Financial market transactions"
An equation system consisting of (D.1) and (D.3)-(D.5) determines the values of the
endogenous variables, RB, cH, and mH. Solving (D.1) and (D.3) for RB gives
H
HH
p
ARpR
B
-
=* . (D.6)
Upon substituting (D.1) and (D.6) into (D.5) we have two equations (D.4) and (D.5) that determine the
remaining two endogenous variables, cH, and mH. After somewhat involved algebra they can be written
as
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é -D
-
-
=
g
m
H
HH
H p
ARpp
h
h )(11* = ÷÷
ø
ö
çç
è
æ D
-
-
g
pR
h
h B
*
11 (D.8)
and
ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é --D
-=
Ap
hIARpp
h H
HH
H g
c
)1()(
11* = ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é -D
-
A
hpIR
h
B
g
)1(
11
*
(D.9)
Equations (D.8) and (D.9) provide four equilibrium existence conditions:
1* £Hm Û
( )[ ]
( )hp
hhpA H
-D
-+
£
1
1 lg
, (D.10)
0* ³Hm Û p
RpIpA HLH
D
-
³
)(
, (D.11)
1* £Hc Û IpRp
pIRp
ppI
pIRpA
LHH
HH
H
HH
-
D
=
+D
D
£ 2g
, (D.12)
and
0* ³Hc Û
( )
( )
( )
( )phpIRp
phIRp
pphI
phIRpA
LHH
HH
H
HH
D+-
D-
=
+D-
D-
³ 2
1
1
1
g
. (D.13)
Since H-types' IC and IR bind, and L-types' IR is satisfied through their IC, the L-type IC is the fifth
equilibrium existence condition. It is satisfied if
AA ˆ£ . (D.14)
The equilibrium may exist between the vertical lines (D.11) and (D.12), which is a nonempty set.
However, the vertical line (D.14) is smaller in value than the vertical line (D.11). This means that the
equilibrium cannot exist for positive cH.
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In contrast, eef LH does exist. To see this, note first that in eef LH , (D.1) holds with a weak
inequality. Then, let cH=0 in (D.4) to get
( )
hI
IhA
H
--
=
1*m . (D.15)
Substituting (D.15) and (D.3) for (D.5) and letting cH=0 yields
( )
( )phpI
AIRpR
L
HH
B D+
-
=* . (D.16)
Inserting (D.16) back into (D.3) gives
( )[ ]
( )phpI
hpIApRpR
L
HHH
F D+
-D-
=
1* . (D.17)
From (D.15) we see that 1* <Hm  holds by our assumption that A<I. An equilibrium existence
condition is thus
0* ³Hm Û ( )IhA -³ 1 . (D.18)
The H-type IR is now ARF ³ , which - using (D.17) - can be expressed as
( )
( )
( )
[ ]phpIRp
hpIRp
phpI
hpIRpA
LHH
HH
H
HH
D+-
-D
=
+-D
-D
³ 2
1
1
1
g
. (D.19)
Similarly, by means of (D.16) and (D.17) the L-type IC (D.2) is given by
( ) ( )[ ]hWA
Rp
I
Rpp
phpWIIA
HHHH
L -D+=
D
D+D
-£ 1ˆ . (D.20)
Conditions (D.18)-(D.20) define the range of parameters for which eef LH  exists. This is shown in the
(A, h)-space in Figure A.4.
FIGURE A.4 HERE
Conditions (D.18)-(D.20) practically mirror those of efe LH  described in Section III.A. Equation
(D.18) defines the downward sloping h=1-A/I diagonal that starts from the (A=0, h=1) corner and ends
in the (A=I, h=0) corner. The L-type IC constraint (D.20) is a downward sloping line that cuts the h=1-
A/I diagonal  at  the  same  point  as  the  vertical ÂI/pLRL line. H-types' IR constraint (D.19) is a
monotonically downward sloping curve that starts from the (A=0, h=1) corner and cuts the h=1-A/I
diagonal once. H-types' IR and L-types' IC constraints and the vertical Â line cross at the same point at
WI
Ahh
D
-º=
gˆ12 .  In  sum,
eef LH  exists  above  the  H-type  IR curve  (D.19)  and below the  L-
type IC line (D.20). This area exists in the upper-left corner of the (A, h)-space where A Î [0, Â] and
[ ]1,2hh Î .
E. efef LH  and efsefs LH
We first prove that efsefs LH  cannot exist for a non-trivial set of parameters. In this equilibrium
( )1,0ÎHm , ( )1,0ÎLm , ( )1,0ÎHc ( )1,0ÎLc . In words, all agents are indifferent between
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entrepreneurship, financing, and using storage. The agents' IR and IC constraints bind, i.e., it must hold
that
ARF = , "L- and H-type IR" (E.1)
FBLL RRRp =- )( , "L-type IC" (E.2),
and
FBHH RRRp =- )( . "H-type IC" (E.3)
Solving (E.2)-(E.3) for RB gives
p
WR
B D
D
=* . (E.6)
Thus, there is a unique value of
A
p
WRp
p
WRpA LLHH ˆ)()( =D
D
-=
D
D
-= . (E.7)
for which this equilibrium can exist. This means that only efef LH (where ( )1,0ÎHm , ( )1,0ÎLm ,
and 0== LH cc ) may exist for a non-trivial range of parameters.
efef LH  is constrained by the following five basic conditions:
ARF ³ , "L- and H-type IR" (E.8)
FBLL RRRp =- )( , "L-type IC" (E.9)
FBHH RRRp =- )( , "H-type IC" (E.10)
( )[ ] ( )[ ] )(11)1()1( AIhhAhh HLLH -+-=--+- mmmm , (E.11)
"Equality of supply and demand for funds"
and
( )[ ] ( )[ ] BHHLLFLH RhphpRhh mmmm +-=--+- 11)1()1( . (E.12)
"Financial market transactions"
Equation system (E.9)-(E.12) determines the values of the endogenous variables, RF, RB, mL,
and mH. Solving (E.9) and (E.10) for RB and RF gives
p
WR
B D
D
=* (E.13)
and
A
p
WRp
p
WRpR LLHHF ˆ)()(
* =
D
D
-=
D
D
-= . (E.14)
Substituting (E.13) and (E.14) into (E.12) and solving (E.11) and (E.12) for mL and mH yields
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and
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Equations (E.15) and (E.16) yield four equilibrium existence conditions:
1* <Hm Û ( )WhARp
IA
LL
D-> ˆ , (E.17)
0* >Hm Û ARp
IA
LL
ˆ< , (E.18)
1* <Lm Û ( )[ ]WhARp
IA
HH
D-+< 1ˆ , (E.19)
and
0* >Lm Û ARp
IA
HH
ˆ> . (E.20)
From equations (E.8)-(E.10) we see that agents' IC constraints bind and IR constraints are satisfied if
AA ˆ£ . (E.21)
This is the fifth equilibrium existence condition. However, we see that if condition (E.21) holds, (E.18)
also holds. The equilibrium is thus defined by equations (E.17), and (E.19)-(E.21). Since (E.19) is
identical to (D.20) we know that it cuts the vertical Â-line at h=h2 where WI
Ah
D
-º
gˆ12  as defined in
Section D of the appendix. This means that when h is large, i.e, [ ]1,2hh Î , the downward sloping line
(E.19) and the vertical line (E.20) are the binding constraints. For [ ]23 , hhh Î  where
HH Rp
Ah
ˆ
3 º ,
the binding constraints are the vertical lines (E.20) and (E.21). For [ ]31, hhh Î , where WI
Ah
D
º
lˆ
1
as defined in Section A of the appendix, the binding constraints are (E.17) (which is identical to (15))
and (E.21). For h<h1, the equilibrium does not exists, since (E.17) is violated.
FIGURE A.5 HERE
In Figure A.5 we illustrate how in terms of the (A, h)-space, efef LH exists in a parallelogram between
the vertical lines (E.20) and (E.21) and the downward sloping lines (E.17) and (E.19). This
parallelogram exists for AÎ (ÂI/pHRH, Â) and [ ]1,1hh Î .
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Figure A.2 (HefLf)
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Figure A.3  (HeLfs)
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Figure A.4  (HefLe)
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Figure A.5 (HefLef)
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